Historians of India's foreign policy have often failed to see beyond the 'Great man' Jawaharlal Nehru. This Nehru-centric vision is not only misleading, but unfair to Nehru. Here, we seek to take the gaze off Nehru and New Delhi so as to view Indian foreign policy from different locations. We examine the ways in which India's diplomats in Australia, Canada and South Africa resisted racial discrimination. India's anti-racist diplomacy has most often been viewed as pointless moralistic ranting: the domain of the 'hypersensitive, emotional' Indian. We argue, however, based on largely unexamined archival material and an emphasis on the practice of Indian diplomacy, that India's diplomats in these bastions of settler-colonial racism were tactful, strategic and effective in challenging racist, colonial practices and bringing an anti-racist discourse to international politics. Nehruvian foreign policy discourse, and its goal of an anti-racist world order, then, was tempered by its diplomatic practices. In particular, this occurred outside of New Delhi in places where India's hopes for productive international relationships clashed with its Nehruvian worldview.
existent', 'abnormal' or not 'grown up'. 3 In contrast, a more situated understanding of those years emerges in some of recent archival work. Here, we seek to add to this relatively-thinbut-growing body of literature which gives us a richer picture of Nehruvian years while also providing theoretical insights into his foreign policy. 4 Two methodological concerns animate our discussions below. First, we are bolstered by the new 'practice turn' in IR which 'zooms in on the quotidian unfolding of international life'. 5 This 'practice turn' emphasizes not a dull recording of events, but decrypts the everyday of the 'international'. It forces us 'to engage with the relationship between agency and the social and natural environments, with both material and discursive factors, and with the simultaneous practice of stability and change'. 6 In other words, the study of practices helps us to unearth the intricate links between discourses, actions and institutions through the critical analysis of the day-to-day actions of diplomats. Practices are everyday rituals where meanings are generated, enacted and reproduced. The practice of diplomacy in this case reveals to us the rough edges that the discourse of foreign policy often flattens, but more so it helps us to appreciate how the discourse of Nehruvian foreign policy shaped, and was shaped by, the practice of international diplomacy and India's national interests.
Here, we see postcolonial India's national interest not as given by the system, but as socially and historically constructed -specifically by the colonial experience. India's interests were mutually constituted with its identity. 7 As Priya Chacko has shown, the guiding discourse of Nehruvian foreign policy was an effort to create a more ethical modernity and a decolonized international system. 8 India's interests, then, lay in a decolonized world order in which it could act independently and without facing old colonial prejudices. How, though, did this clash with day-to-day diplomatic practices? How did diplomats maintain friendly relations with potentially useful partners (like Canada and Australia, less so South Africa) and yet live up to Nehru's postcolonial project? Here, we consider the ways in which India's diplomats navigated the thin line between upholding India's declared principle of anti-racism in the still-racist White Dominions and staying within the established principles of diplomatic conduct. When it came to foreign policy, an
Indian diplomat once describe Nehru as the painter -he was the one who set up the discourse -while the diplomats were 'merely touch-up artists' and 'brokers'. 9 But invariably, the burden of making the painting saleable was placed on just these 'touch-up artists'. This required finding textures and strategies suited to their particular context. In the final analysis, it was the painting itself that was suitably enhanced by these diplomats.
This leads to our second methodological issue. The excessive focus on Nehru in studies of what is known as 'Nehruvian' foreign policy, while understandable, is also one of the reasons why these studies remain constrained. The obsession with locating all foreign policy activity at the feet of Nehru leads to an overemphasis on his agency. Archival sources instead lead us to alternative narratives on foreign policy that could confirm, correct or contest Nehru's ideas. In seeking to draw from this narrative multiverse, we have chosen to write histories of little-known and lost diplomats, and avoided tracing diplomatic history only at the centre of decision making, (i.e. either Nehru or the Ministry of External Affairs). We attempt to write our narrative from the diplomatic field and see how the diplomats located outside India contributed to the development of a postcolonial foreign policy discourse.
Bearing in mind these methodological preferences, we look at India's diplomatic practice with regard to three major settler-colonial states in the Commonwealth -South
Africa, Canada and Australia -in the pre-Bandung era. We begin in 1946 when the interim government under Nehru came to power and close with India's ending of diplomatic relations with South Africa in 1954. Post-1954, India's Commonwealth diplomacy entered a new phase for two reasons. First, it had exhausted all bilateral diplomatic tools with South Africa and hence the focus shifted to the UN. Second, with Bandung conference, a whole new set of alliances and actors campaigned for a non-racial world order. Until then, India stood as the most significant agent that consistently strived for a non-racial world order.
India's diplomacy, as we will argue below, tight-rope walked between campaigning for non-racialism while seeking to interfere, sometimes subtly, sometimes openly, in the domestic jurisdiction of its fellow Commonwealth states. By making calculated strategic choices, Indian diplomats navigated the terrain of the post-world war normative order, which was beginning to be more open to questioning racism -following the 'boomerang effect', as
Aime Cesaire called it, of Nazism -but was still reluctant enough to embrace global nonracial norms. 10 The decolonisation process had pushed countries like India to the forefront of the calls for non-racial world order, but it had still not caught significant momentum of its own to generate non-western solidarity of the post-Bandung era. In this in-between phase, Indian diplomats posted in the White Dominions of the Commonwealth had to tread a cautious line that advanced the Indian non-racial agenda but also did not offend their hosts by stepping on their domestic jurisdiction.
'Presenting the New Spirit of Independent India': India's South African Policy
We will begin with the most challenging environment for Indian diplomats to engage with, South Africa, before moving on to examples where Indian diplomats had to be more cautious.
India's complaint to the United Nations against the treatment of Indians in South Africa was its inaugural diplomatic move in world affairs. 11 Before taking the case to the UN, India had already broken off trade ties with South Africa and recalled its High Commissioner R.M.
Deshmukh for consultations. Shrewdly, however, India's moral outrage was channelled strategically. By presenting this recall as only 'for consultations', India let an otherwise fully functioning High Commission remain in the country thereby keeping its diplomatic ears close to the developments in South Africa. India had commenced a high pitched battle with South Africa, led by Jan Smuts, at the UN. 13 The newly independent India needed all its diplomatic mettle against Smuts. There were suggestions that either Nehru or Gandhi should lead the Indian delegation. 14 Africa. 22 He advised the government to use every opportunity to extend symbolically its support to the African population in South Africa. Strongly pushing for making anti-racism a sign-post of new India's foreign policy, he proposed organizing an '"Anti-Racial Discrimination"' conference on the lines of the Asian Relations conference. This, in his view, would help in coordination of a drive against such discrimination in South Africa. 23 Likewise, he admonished the moderate section for keeping the struggle limited to Indians. 24 Using his position as a link between the Indian government and the Indian population in South Africa, he advised both sides to broaden their political support to include Africans.
Chari's counsel for broadening India's support to the Africans was also driven by an acute analysis of Prime Minister Malan's grand designs of White pan-Africanism. Malan had expounded a pan-African unity of white governments in Africa 'to secure unity in colour policy and co-operation in defence'. 25 This was not new. Smuts had expressed similar ambitions for a 'federation of white-controlled states'. 26 In Chari's opinion, South Africa's internal racism ought to be seen in conjunction with its external attempts at creating a panAfrican unity of white governments in Africa. Given the significant diasporic presence of Indians in eastern and southern Africa, this was a worrying sign and India must subvert these designs by building a broader solidarity with Africans. 27 While the MEA thought of this picture as 'overdrawn', 28 the general advice of broadening the agenda was realized in 1952
when India helped in the introduction of racial discrimination under apartheid a separate agenda item at the UN General Assembly.
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While pushing for the broadening of Indian support to sections within South Africa, Chari advocated keeping all channels of communications with South Africa open. Until then, India had focused its energies at making a case against South Africa the UN. In 1947, a chain of letters had passed between Nehru and Smuts for initiating bilateral discussions, but procedural rather than substantive issues seemed to guide their concerns and these overtures failed. 30 Chari was aware that India could not rely only on shaming South Africa at the UN.
The solution eventually would have to come through talks. The departure of Smuts from power, Chari felt, provided a window of opportunity for India. The new Prime Minister, D.F.
Malan, was more conservative but was also keener and more earnest to solve the Indian issue.
Smuts had a tendency to 'let things develop' and prevaricate on the Indian issue. Although a liberal, Smuts was reluctant to expend his hard earned political capital on an issue that touched the raw nerve of the South African white community, especially the mostly-English province of Natal. This was evident in Smuts's previous face-off with Indian diplomats in the 1920s. In strategic terms, while Smuts's internationalist liberalism meant that his original win-set in negotiations on the Indian question was larger than Malan, without a sound domestic base he was reluctant to enlarge it further. Malan, in contrast, came with a smaller win-set but eager to gain international legitimacy and more sure-footed about his domestic legitimacy, he was likely to be far more elastic during negotiations. 31 In fact, Malan, in the past, had been a part of two roundtable conferences with India and was instrumental in achieving the Cape Town Agreement of 1927. However, there was only a small window of opportunity here. Any talks would have to happen before Malan had committed domestically in the form of an anti-Indian law and frozen his own win-set.
Based on these assumptions, Chari suggested to the MEA to seriously consider holding a Roundtable Conference as soon as Malan came to power. In any case, UN resolutions which were deemed condemnatory were likely to cut much less ice with Malan than Smuts and hence direct negotiations were preferable. Further, Chari argued that Indian passive resistance in South Africa was beginning to wane and talks between the governments will give South African Indians a breathing space and an honourable exit to withdraw from passive resistance. 
Negotiating 'unreasoning prejudice': India and Canada
Unlike in South Africa, Indian diplomats in Canada and Australia were not prepared to undermine relations to achieve goals of racial discrimination. Given that India-South Africa relations were quite strained, Chari had a greater leeway in expressing his critical opinions within South Africa as well as to the MEA headquarters in Delhi than his counterparts in Canada and Australia. We can still see, however, that ending racial restrictions in these former settler colonies was still central to the practice of Indian diplomacy. Canada supported India's independence and in the period considered here, was able to develop what has sometimes been considered a 'special relationship', albeit one that disintegrated quickly. 35 There were two issues of racial discrimination and immigration that India sought to attack:
the internal discrimination towards Indians already residing in Canada and the discriminatory polices denying Indians the ability to immigrate. All Indians in Canada had been asked to report to the government in 1939, solely so that the government could gauge their population. 36 They were not deported, but were also denied any official status. After independence, the Indian government raised this matter with Canada, and negotiations followed quickly.
Discussions occurred because Canadian diplomats in Delhi had hinted informally, prior to partition, to Indian foreign affairs officials that they would be prepared to take representations from the Government of India on the matter. Leslie Chance, a Canadian
Diplomat based in Ottawa, suggested that they could consider drafting laws 'more acceptable to the susceptibilities of the Indian people'. 37 A few months prior, the interim Government of India requested that the Canadian Government pressure the government of British Columbia 'to confer the franchise on the small Indian community in that province and thus rectify the present anomalous position which is a source of humiliation to Indians'. 38 The immigration matter, and the possible negotiation, was put forward to the Canadians very early on as well. Bajpai, as was relayed to John Kearney, believed it would be impossible for India to remain part of the Commonwealth as a dominion. 39 It would be possible, however, to remain as a republic, but it was politically difficult. Kearney cabled back to Ottawa:
There are certain obstacles which if not removed, might make even this latter arrangement impossible, the chief of which is the immigration policy of some of the other Commonwealth nations, more particularly Australia and Canada. 40 Bajpai went on to argue (reportedly) that it would be far easier for Nehru to argue for membership in the Commonwealth 'if Canada and Australia made an immigration concession such as was made some time ago by the United States'. 41 The suggestion here was essentially that Australia's and Canada's restrictive immigration polices ensured that the Commonwealth was a space of discrimination -and not one that postcolonial India could be part of. Bajpai was willing to risk India's relationship with the Commonwealth in order to extract concessions from Canada over its immigration policy, suggesting strongly that restrictive immigration policies deeply offended India. St. Laurent later gave his external affairs minister Lester Pearson full authority to do whatever was necessary to keep India in the Commonwealth, suggesting it was a major priority. 42 Canada had been handed important reasons to consider accepting some small concessions to India on its immigration policy. Kearney relayed Sir Girja Bajpai's thoughts with some direct honesty:
Frankly, I am a little jealous of the way the Government of the United States has handled the Indian immigration problem. It has succeeded in preventing large numbers going to the United States by a method which seems completely satisfactory and praiseworthy to India, and it is something which I think we might usefully keep in front of us. Saskena.
Hardit Singh Malik, Santdas Kirpalani and Canada's discriminatory practices
India's first two high commissioners to Canada were both products of the British Raj. Hardit
Singh Malik was a well-respected Sikh diplomat with a history of sporting prowess and service in the Indian Army. He had served in World War One with Canada's foreign minister Lester Pearson. 44 Santdas Kirpalani, who succeeded Malik after just two years, had similarly spent 34 years working with the Indian Civil Service prior to becoming a diplomat after independence. 45 Malik arrived in Canada just prior to Indian independence. He received a rousing welcome from the Indian community, especially the Sikh population. As he recalled in his memoirs, this deeply touched him and he felt committed to work for the citizenship rights of Indians in Canada. 46 In his short stay in Canada, his principle two achievements were the beginning of a productive India-Canada relationship and the removal of internal discrimination against Indians. Unlike diplomats sent to Australia and South Africa, Malik was given the opportunity to participate in negotiations over the removal of discrimination against Indians already in Canada. That negotiation over matters of immigration happened at all needs to be emphasized strongly here. As will be seen in the case of Australia, the matter of racial discrimination was not openly discussed, and so no negotiations ever took place. It is clear that India's policy on commenting on these matters was contextual rather than ironclad: in the case of Canada, it was worth making such a request as doing so had some hope of success. As a result of this agreement the perception of Canada in India had risen sharply. As John Kearney, Canadian High Commissioner to India put it, 'compared to fellow Commonwealth countries, however, such as South Africa and Australia, Canada in Indian eyes is regarded almost as a paragon of virtue, especially since the granting to Indians federal and provincial franchise.' 53 This immigration quota of 150 Indians was most certainly a token agreement. The Canadians had been careful to maintain their sense of whiteness with such small token. However, for the Indians the principle that an Indian could become a Canadian was more important than the practice. In the long run, however, once the principle had been enshrined, the practice of allowing Indians to move to Canada was sure to follow.
Ramji Saksena and the India Quota
Given how easily negotiations on the position of people of Indian origin in British Colombia and the immigration agreement had proceeded, the Canadians might not have expected any further troubles on this front. The quota, however, was an obviously token arrangement.
Despite India's willingness to accept a token quota of emigrants, the matter was not closed. of Canada. However, these immigrants had to be included as part of the quota, and could not enter outside of it. Saksena enquired 'informally' as to whether or not this proviso might be changed, to allow more Indians into Canada. 54 He argued that the number of Indians in Canada had actually dropped from 5,000 to 1,200 since 1908, and that under his plan, it would still take several years for the number to rise back to such a level. In this sense, the argument that Indians might disrupt Canadian life was somewhat absurd. Saksena later argued that:
The grievance of Canadian East-Indians that in this regard they were being discriminated against on grounds of race, has not been removed wholly or even partly. My submission to the Minister was that he might now feel disposed to grant Canadian East-Indians the same rights as were enjoyed by other Canadian nationals. I had also pointed out that the grant of this privilege would not have any far-reaching effect as the numbers involved were, on the whole, small. This led to a combination of friendly nudging and negotiation from some diplomats, and outright critique from others. This shows that Indian diplomatic practice in Canada dealt with issues of race and racism on a day-to-day basis. While in Canada they faced a friendly environment, Indian diplomats operated in far more difficult circumstances in Australia.
Official Silence, Unofficial Resistance: India and the White Australia Policy
While India's diplomats found relatively easy environment within which to operate in Canada, they were not nearly so lucky in Australia. First, Bajpai's suggestion that India might withdraw from the Commonwealth if it was perceived as a racist organisation does not seem to have been repeated to the Australians. Here, the Indians were tactful, and mostly resisted silently through their form of diplomatic practice. Numerous Indian diplomats mention in dispatches, however, that the Australians were 'jittery' or anxious about their immigration policy and criticized it, keeping track of it on a regular basis. Indeed, we would go so far as to argue that an official silence was a considerable part of India's approach to the White Australia policy. However, unofficial, unsanctioned criticisms were made by at least one Indian diplomat.
Jawaharlal Nehru very rarely commented on the White Australia policy. There was one occasion, however, when Nehru was asked if he thought there was a place for a White Australia in Asia. He responded that Australia could justify the policy in short term, provided it was only done so for economic reasons, rather than racial ones. He added that in the long term '…it is difficult to see in the world today how far it is possible to keep a vast continent undeveloped'. He went on to further say that 'Australia should not discriminate against the rights and privileges of Asians living there'. 64 This was grossly misinterpreted by Herbert Evatt, Australian foreign minister as an assurance that Nehru supported the White Australia policy. 65 Nehru responded that:
In the course of an interview with an Australian Newspaper correspondent some time ago I stated that I could understand an emigration policy based on economic considerations with a view to maintain certain standards and ways of living, but that I thought a racial policy was wrong and to be deprecated. 66 Nehru was pressed on this by an Australian Labor Party Member, to which an MEA undersecretary responded: 'it is essentially an Australian question within the sovereign jurisdiction of your people and parliament'. no intricate political questions between the countries' during his time in Australia. 68 In his mind, this meant that 'the main function of the High Commissioner and his Office was to make India better known to Australia'. This being the case, the main struggle for Paranjpye was the White Australia policy, which he believed 'naturally this causes a great deal of heartburning and resentment among non-white people', and particularly offended Indians.
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Paranjpye also emphasized that, while this was offensive to India, it was not the place of the High Commission to actively attack a domestic policy. He argued that argued that changing this policy was not the place of India, but that it could be brought about by a 'better understanding among different nations, through closer trade and cultural relations, and through an increase in tourist traffic. 70 Thus, educating the Australians about India was his focus, attempting to dispel stereotypes and misperceptions of India in Australia. This became a very important practice of lager senior Indian diplomats in Australia.
In 1947, under the tenure of High Commissioner Daya Singh Bedi, it was debated between the MEA and the Indian High Commission in India whether or not it was within the bounds of the ministry to consider and keep track of the Australia's immigration policy. 71 It was concluded by the MEA that, while it was not their place to complain, it was within their remit to report on the policy. India and Indian diplomats, as will be seen, instead took the approach more generally of trying to raise the profile of India in Australia in the hope that a more informed Australian public would appreciate India's non-alignment and opposition to racism and discrimination in world affairs. On a visit to Queensland, Bedi argued to the MEA that 'although there is no racial discrimination, particularly in the common man, there is that racial prejudice which is inherent in the white man and it will take time before that is finally eradicated.' 72 He continued that 'they will be inclined to adhere to the tradition of following in the wake of the British and to an extent the United States of America', as Australia was 'very much concerned to save [its] "white democracy" in the southern hemisphere…'. 73 The rest of Bedi's tenure is very poorly documented at the NAI, though he was clearly concerned about Australia's racist practices.
General Kodandera Cariappa and the White Australia Policy
While the official policy of India was not to interfere directly with the White Australia policy, but to report on it and to raise the profile of India, one Indian diplomat, General Kodandera Cariappa, spoke out against the policy without official consent from the MEA.
Cariappa was pulled out of retirement from the Indian army personally by Jawaharlal Nehru Cariappa's comments were widely reported in the press, generating very negative
coverage. An editorial in The Argus expressed the hope that the intensity of the debate would die down so that a conversation could take place about the white Australia policy as shaping Australia's international relations without 'wanting to fling off our coats and punch General
Cariappa and other critics on the nose.' The editorial continued that '…it is about time that As a solider myself, I believe that strategically Australia needs India's continued friendship. The Parliamentary Constitution of India, the principles on which its political life functions, all stem from the home of democracy -Great Britain.
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Here, Cariappa evokes a shared colonial heritage to argue that the White Australia policy discriminated against Commonwealth allies in favour of WWII enemies. This argument was extremely well tailored to its audience.
The official response to Cariappa's comments was muted, despite the press hysteria.
Walter Crocker, Australia's High Commissioner in India investigated briefly, and concluded that Cariappa's 'standing with the powers-that-be here is weak' and that the MEA believed him to 'have failed in Australia… due to his vanity'. 80 Crocker did, however, discuss the matter with the Commonwealth Secretary Subimal Dutt, who reportedly told him that Indians had 'no interest in Australian immigration policy'. 81 Crocker concluded that Dutt 'obviously thinks that Cariappa is not all there' in his failure to follow the government line. 82 Given
Cariappa stayed in Australia until 1956, he was too easily dismissed by the Australians.
Following the negative press commentary, Cariappa wrote to N.R. Pillai, then
Secretary General of the MEA. He complained that Indians were not well treated in Australia, and were not given the rights that they should have as citizens:
Having met a number of Indian settlers here and in New Zealand… I cannot help the feeling that the people of this country, although they profess to be very democratic, simple friendly and all that, have a very poor opinion of Asians in regard to our standards of living and so on. 83 He further wrote that he had tried to use the Commonwealth as a means of shifting opinions on Indians, but was always told that 'if we took you what about the Chinese and the Japanese…'. 84 He concluded: 'This is the way they think. They are scared stiff of Asians over-running their country if the relaxed their Immigration policy!!' 85 He felt that he was unable to leave immediately, instead changing his 'mission' in Australia to change the Australian people's mind with regard to Indians and Asia in general. As he put it, 'Selfrespect demands that I must return at once, but my sense of duty to our people demands that I should stay here'. Cariappa, Paranjpye and Bedi had to control their instincts and temper the anticolonial framings of Nehruvian foreign policy. They were acting in an environment where being 'emotional' was seen as both weak and particularly Indian, and so had to remain tactful. As the response to Cariappa's comment shows, any public statement against the White Australia policy was sure to be met with accusations of Indian hypersensitivity and emotionalism. And yet, the Australians, Canadians, and South Africans were just as sensitive to perceived Indian 'hypersensitivity' as Indians were sensitive to racism. By staying mostly quiet, disrupting stereotypes and raising the profile of India, these diplomats were able to resist racial discrimination while tactfully showing their displeasure. When Cariappa did speak out, he did so forcefully and by tailoring his arguments to his audience, appealing to the Commonwealth and shared sacrifices rather than wild accusations of racism. For the most part, though, the Indians were careful not to speak openly, as they knew this would be unhelpful. Nehruvian globalism as a discourse had to be tempered through a strategic and cautious approach was. As such, Indian diplomats saved their public condemnations for South Africa and practiced a subtle form dissent in Australia and Canada, so as to gradually reshape the attitudes of these settler-colonies.
Conclusion: Foreign policy as Postcolonial Practice
India's independence was, in the words of WEB Du Bois, 'the greatest historical date of the nineteenth and twentieth century'. 90 The pan-Africanist scholar had hailed it as the inaugural move of de-racialization of the world. But these proclamations had to be tempered with the limits of diplomatic practice. With some notable exceptions, Indian diplomats in Canada and Australia were cautious, tactful seeking to educate these settler-colonial states about India, disrupting stereotypes, and arguing against discriminatory policies only when such arguments were ready to be heard. In South Africa, however, such practices had long been exhausted before independence. The political struggle in South Africa was in far more advanced stages, as both South African Indians and Indian diplomats had long been seeking to dismantle South Africa's racist practices. Consequently India was prepared to refuse diplomatic relations, amid loud and very public condemnations of racial policies, so abhorrent was apartheid to postcolonial India. In each case, the context shaped the method of resistance. India's efforts were largely successful in Canada, less so in Australia, and ultimately could not persuade South Africa to give up its racist policies. They did, however, play a key role in South Africa becoming an international pariah, and the pressure generated was eventually part of the end of apartheid regime. In each case, however, they succeeded in making racial discrimination an international issue.
Nehruvian globalism as the dominant ideology of India's foreign policy was constrained by India's entry into international diplomatic circles after independence. India's postcolonial national interest, as it was constructed, lay in the removal of racial discrimination and the decolonization of world order. It pursued this goal throughout the Commonwealth by various means. Many of these Indian diplomats had been educated through British institutions, and had respect for international norms of non-interference. They could not pursue this goal single-mindedly -as a civil society group like the NAACP was able to do from America. 91 They were, however, prepared to take such an approach with South Africa. At each and every opportunity, however, Indian diplomats nudged their Australian and Canadian colleagues within the 'acceptable' confines of the international system India now found itself. 'The problem of racialism and racial separation', Nehru stated in 1954, 'may become more dangerous than any other problem that the world has to face'. 92 Aware of the discursive ramifications of the security driven discourse of post-WW II era, Nehru recognized that India 'cannot do anything effective' by 'mere shouting' from every platform. Instead, he said, 'we remain quiet'. 93 Yet, between and betwixt these shouts and silences, there remained the grey zone of subversive politics. The diplomats in South Africa, Canada and Australia played instrumental roles in surreptitiously and cautiously engineering a complex debate on racism. More than anything else, the responses of these diplomats were driven by the context rather than uncritical fealty to either moral politics or diplomatic practice based on just a narrow conception of material national interest.
This then, leads us to end this discussion with three general points about Indian foreign policy and international relations. First, as Nicolas Guilhot has persuasively argued, decolonisation and race were deliberately excised from narratives of post-World War II order. 94 Security became the primary concern of theories and discussions on international relations. While this has, on the one hand, made our understanding of the 'international'
poorer by enshrining a natural hierarchy of issue areas, on the other, it has hidden from us foreign policy practices that are deemed outside the remit of 'security studies'. Consequently, the studies of Indian foreign policy, for instance, assume any discussions on 'non-racial world order' as inherently 'moral' discussions and hence not foreign policy per se. Yet, discussions of these issues -often assumed peripheral to foreign policy -were at the centre of India's diplomacy because they had wider ramifications on India's place in the world and its own understanding of self.
Second, the focus on diplomatic practices allows us to appreciate linkages between agency and structure, individuals and institutions, and discourse and practice. In seeking to create a post-racist world, Indian diplomats often were not always aggressive -except perhaps at the United Nations. Instead, in this case, the supposed high-octane 'revolt against the West' 95 was more about nudging, often gently, sometimes less so, the settler-colonial powers to end their practices of racial discrimination. The diplomats often nibbled at the boundaries of agreeable conduct but through this pushed the normative boundaries of the contemporary order. The practice of Indian diplomats, particularly in Australia and Canada, reveals a subtle resistance to the norm of non-interference. On a day-to-day basis these diplomats routinely looked for ways in which they could fight racial discrimination and challenge racialized stereotypes. In South Africa, the moral talk of post-racial order was married with the desire for pragmatic results. But this went hand-in-hand with a course of self-correction -making a common cause with Africans (which was a significant departure from the Indians struggle in South Africa since the days of Gandhi). Collectively, this practice revealed to the policy makers, Nehru in particular, the limits as well as possibilities of India's anti-racist discourse. Regardless of whether or not these diplomats were successful -and they were to a limited extent -this adds a new layer of understanding to the formulation of Indian foreign policy under Nehru.
Finally, and this is symbolic of the tyranny of the 'great man' school of diplomatic history, these Indian diplomats have been lost in India's dusty, unexplored and overly censored archives. Without seeking to end on a lament, although Indian archival practices are themselves complicit in this dearth of information, diplomatic historians have also been responsible due to their reluctance to access and utilize these sources. Nevertheless, studies of Indian foreign policy would allow us a much wider canvas to paint with our analytical brushes if diplomatic history becomes at least an important sub-school of Indian IR.
End Notes

